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Abstract: The article analyses the evolution, during the 2000s and 2010s, of civic engagement and 
political mobilisation of post-Soviet Russian-speaking migrants living in the UK. The article 
highlights the importance of these migrants’ inherently transnational position in-between two or 
more distinct polities. Transformations of their mobilisations across the period in question are seen 
as governed by the following key factors: the changing context of immigration opportunities in the 
UK; the technological advancements of new modes of communication; larger political shifts in both 
Russia and the UK; and, especially significantly, the availability of specific opportunity structures 
for mobilisation. The principal opportunity structures available to UK Russian-speaking migrants in 
the 2000s were those that fostered their mobilisation as a culturally-defined minority migrant 
community on the British multicultural model and those that encouraged Russians in the diaspora to 
become part of a global network of Russian ‘compatriots’ loyal in the first place to their country of 
origin. A new, short-lived, opportunity structure emerged in the early 2010s in the form of a 
transnational protest movement against political corruption in the Russian Federation. However, as 
the Russian government introduced policies effecting a growing disenfranchisement of Russians 
permanently resident abroad from political developments in Russia itself, many Russians in the UK 
started to look for new ways to engage with UK’s own political and civic sphere. Towards the end 
of the 2010s, the politics of Brexit have become one new opportunity structure for at least some 
Russians living in the UK to mobilise as part of the British polity for a cause that is both very 
British and eminently transnational. 
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Introduction 
During the 2010s, both Britain and Russia experienced significant political turns, gravely perturbing 
these countries’ political landscapes. Britain has been gradually sliding from centre-left to populist 
right, especially on the issue of immigration, culminating in the crisis brought about by the nation 
voting to leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum. While an extensive body of political 
and media analysis has expanded on the growing gaps in the tissue of British society during this 
period, relatively little attention has been paid to the political involvement in these developments of 
so-called ‘new citizens’, recently naturalised subjects of the Crown, let alone other migrants in 
various stages of settling in Britain. 
Over this same period, the Russian Federation has gone through its own political turbulence. The 
unprecedented degree of popular unrest between the December 2011 Duma elections and the March 
2012 presidential elections created a vocal anti-government protest movement which continues to 
trouble the state despite a clampdown on mass demonstrations. Since 2014, Russia has also been 
facing growing international criticism, following its appropriation of Crimea, its perceived role in 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, its military support of pro-government forces in the Syrian war, and 
its alleged meddling in elections in some Western countries. 
Caught up simultaneously in both sets of developments, Russians resident in the UK – to include, 
however, not only those who had migrated from the Russian Federation, but also a more loosely 
defined body of those who identify themselves as ‘Russian’, even if coming from another part of 
the former Soviet space1 – have been prompted to respond to them in various ways, especially 
through online commentary and campaigning, but also through offline civic or political action. Such 
mobilisations have revealed, even more strongly than before, both the opportunities and the 
challenges of the distinctive transnational position that migrants assume in the relevant political 
fields. As we shall see, the transnationalism of the ‘Russian’ migrant body discussed in this article 
is particularly complex, as it entails, simultaneously, different transnational relationships – those 
established through the positioning of this migrant body between a ‘sending’ and a ‘receiving’ state 
(e.g. the Russian Federation and the UK); but also those established in the context of the 
                                                          
1 It is notoriously difficult to define ‘Russians’ in the post-Soviet diasporic context. It is, of course, important to bear in mind the 
difference in legal status between those in the diaspora who are citizens of the Russian Federation and those who understand 
themselves as ‘Russian’, yet come from another post-Soviet country or only ever held Soviet citizenship. It is equally important to 
distinguish ‘Russian-speakers’ who identify strongly with Russian history, culture and politics, even without ever having lived in 
Russia, and those for whom their linguistic identity as native speakers of Russian might be quite separate from their national cultural 
and political self-identifications, and who might, in fact, be rejecting any association with Russia or the Russians. Furthermore, 
individuals are likely to position and identify themselves in different ways at different times and in different situations, which means 
that when discussing the political, civic and cultural mobilisations of the migrants in question, it is very difficult to define in advance 
and in a stable way who and in what way precisely belongs to this group. Of course, certain objective criteria are crucial in certain 
circumstances: for example, only those with Russian citizenship are able take part in Russian elections; however, even those without 
Russian citizenship can still be highly motivated to take part in public debates or protests of concern to Russian domestic and 
international politics. 
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development of a community of ‘Russians’ which transcends nation-state boundaries as the legacy 
of a longer history of Russian and Soviet empire-building, waves of emigration, as well as some of 
the newer, twenty-first-century, patterns of this group’s global diasporisation. This group’s political 
transnationalism is enacted in a range of different contexts and through a variety of different types 
of action.2 For example, those from the former Soviet area living in the West and identifying as 
‘Russian’ or ‘Russian-speaker’ have been the objects of and participants in actions initiated by the 
Russian state (such as the various projects of the Russian government to develop politically 
significant ties with the diaspora). At the same time, Russian migrants’ transnational activism has 
also been taking place through spontaneous and informal networking across national borders, 
thanks especially to new digital technologies and social-networking infrastructures. 
Literature on migrant transnationalism has initially focused on questions of the migrants’ multiple 
belonging and conflicting solidarities: collective action by migrants has in this context been 
examined principally from the perspective of their ethnic self-organisation and their efforts to 
mediate culturally-specific social needs (Pilati & Morales, 2016; Guigni et al., 2013). With the 
growing importance of remittances, increased possibilities of transnational communication, and the 
rise in dual and second citizenships, a growing body of literature now also reflects on migrants’ 
widening participation in the polities of their countries of origin (Dufoix, 2002; Byford, 2012). 
However, scholarship on the activism of migrants in the host countries outside of ethnic-based 
politics is only emerging (Zapata-Borrero et al., 2013). In this context, the question of the political 
and ideological integration of settled migrants and ‘new citizens’ in the receiving countries remains 
poorly conceptualised. For example, while the 2015 report on indicators of the civic integration of 
immigrants, published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
proclaims that ‘[b]ecoming actively involved in the host country’s society is a key element in 
immigrant integration’ (OECD, 2015: 203), this document lists only two core indicators of political 
integration, both entirely formal and fundamentally individual in nature: the act of naturalisation 
and one’s participation in the host country’s elections. Such a restricted perspective is also applied 
to indicators of migrants’ involvement in the political sphere of their home country, which is often 
reduced to voting in national elections via embassies or by other remote means.  
                                                          
2 We here have in mind primarily the participation in political and civic action of migrants in general, rather than, say, the more 
focused oppositional activities of political exiles, whose political activism is of a more ‘professional’ kind. Of specific interest to the 
discussion that follows is migrants’ collective action, especially action of a social movement type around a set of agendas or issues of 
political concern in a broad sense, ranging from the politically relevant promotion of a particular cultural identity to different forms 
of participation in a given state’s domestic or international politics. We include here both online and offline activism, not least since 
these are often closely intertwined. This is not, however, to argue that vocal participation in political debates in the social media is 
the same as taking part in street protests or organising and attending public events. 
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Such a perspective radically narrows down the range of political activities that ordinary migrants 
are expected to engage in, excluding a whole array of collective and individual actions aimed at 
altering the social organisation and power relations in a given polity (whether ‘home’ or ‘host’). 
The OECD document does not specify the mechanisms through which settled migrants (to include 
those with citizenship) can become more actively incorporated into the receiving state’s political 
sphere as a group that occupies a distinctive transnational position. In the UK, for example, migrant 
participation in the civic life of the host society is often reduced to representations of ethno-cultural 
difference. Britain has long-standing policies designed to support newcomers’ ethno-cultural self-
expression and community-building. However, this ideology and practice of ‘multiculturalism’ 
invariably overplays the importance of performances of ethno-cultural identity at the expense of 
other areas of civic and political life, confining migrants’ engagement in the host country to a form 
of representative ‘cultural membership’. This limited understanding of a group’s integration in a 
given society, liberal as it might seem, masks, often quite effectively, the absence of alternative 
structures and agendas of civic and political participation for those who come to join a polity from 
‘outside’. 
As Rainer Bauböck has observed, migration creates ‘a mismatch between territorial and personal 
boundaries of polities’ (Bauböck, 2003: 701). This means that when studying the way in which 
migrants engage in politics, it is not possible to assume a person’s belonging to a single state-bound 
body politic. Migrants’ transnationalism refers to their ability to claim membership of more than 
just one society. This membership is, however, asymmetrical: the political issues and events that 
animate migrants the most, the degree to which they engage with them, and the modes of 
mobilisation that they resort to, will vary from case to case, depending on whether the context is the 
politics of their ‘homeland’ or the host state. 
Migrants’ transnationalism certainly creates opportunities for them to take part in the political life 
of both the country of origin and the receiving state. However, migrants are often not recognised as 
belonging legitimately to the body politic of either the country of origin or the receiving state. What 
is at issue here are not an individual’s legal rights as a citizen of this or that country (e.g. the right to 
vote in elections, to form political organisations or to join civic campaigns), but a broader 
understanding of legitimacy that refers to social perceptions (including the migrants’ own self-
perception) – here the perception of the extent to which someone ‘truly’ belongs to a given national 
body politic and the degree to which they then have the moral right to participate in its politics. 
Indeed, those who have left their country to settle elsewhere are often seen as forsaking their moral 
right to participate in their homeland’s politics as fully as those who are still living there. At the 
same time, recently naturalised ‘new citizens’ are commonly perceived by the members of the 
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receiving society as lacking the required undivided loyalty to the nation (which they have only just 
been permitted to join) to engage in its politics on a par with those born and raised in the country. 
What is more, these ‘new citizens’ might themselves feel partially dissociated from the politics of 
the country which they had made their home, especially early on. 
This position ‘between two stools’ can become especially pronounced in certain political contexts. 
For example, the neo-nationalism that currently dominates Russian politics and thrives on a 
conflictual relationship with the West has tended to question the extent to which those who had left 
the country are qualified to participate legitimately in Russian political life. From this neo-
nationalist perspective, ‘Russians abroad’ are expected to become ‘compatriots outside Russia’, 
sympathising with and defending the political interests of their ‘motherland’ (the Russian 
Federation) in the foreign country in which they now reside (cf. Byford 2012). If Russians living 
abroad happen to show initiative to transform the political order in Russia itself (as happened during 
the 2012 protests), Russian authorities perceive this as a potential theat; they frame it as a form of 
‘extrinsic’ influence, the risks of which need to be managed and mitigated.  
On the side of the receiving state, Britain’s increasingly sour relationship with the European Union 
in this same period and especially its native population’s growing hostility towards immigration, 
not least that which comes from ‘Eastern Europe’, have forced many Russian migrants to start 
rethinking their own place in British society – a society in which they had initially been made to 
feel, on the whole, ‘welcome’. At the same time, to the extent to which Russians living in the UK 
have been side-lined from Russian politics during the mid-2010s, they have become 
correspondingly more inclined to mobilise around issues of concern to UK politics, and this despite 
the fact that the structures of political life in the UK provide, as we shall see, only relatively narrow 
opportunities for such mobilisation. The most recent national turmoil of Brexit is (as we shall 
discuss at the end of this article) prompting many Russians settled in the UK to start renegotiating 
the terms in which they define their belonging, as (actual or prospective) ‘new citizens’, in a 
country in which the forces of anti-immigrant populism appear to have gained the upper hand. 
Crucial to studying migrants’ political mobilisations in a transnational context is to place such 
mobilisations (in all their diversity) in the context of wider shifts in the transnational political 
sphere and to identify conditions in ‘the [concrete] political environment that provide incentives for 
people to undertake collective action’ (Tarrow, 1994: 85), which includes, in particular, the analysis 
of key ‘opportunity structures’, i.e. factors in the socio-political environment that stimulate or limit, 
direct and shape particular kinds of collective action (McAdam, 1996; McAdam et al., 2001). As 
we shall argue, both the wider transnational political context and the specific ‘opportunity 
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structures’ for collective action that Russians in the UK were able to rely on evolved and shifted in 
significant ways across the 2000s and 2010s. 
One must also note that the trans-nationalism of this activism does not mean that those who engage 
in it are not discursively enacting a given ‘national body’ (a ‘body’ that is presumed to be sharing a 
common political past, present and future; cf. Wodak 2009: 30). The manner in which such a 
‘national body’ is enacted by transnationally positioned migrant ‘Russians’ will depend, however, 
on the concrete political context in which this enactment takes place. Moreover, as we shall be 
highlighting in what follows, changing political circumstances (such as those affecting both Russia 
and Britain across the 2000s-2010s) are likely to prompt a continuous process of renegotiation of 
the identity of this ‘national body’. 
We shall first provide an overview of post-Soviet Russian-speaking migration to, and self-
organisation in, the UK prior to 2010. Migrants’ relationship towards and interest in the politics of 
the Russian Federation and the wider former Soviet space at that time was both modest and 
moderate. Moreover, the majority was approving of Russia’s desire during this period to open up to 
the world and reassert itself on the international stage; and many were happy, in their capacity of 
‘Russians abroad’, to be incorporated into this strategy, at least in some way. As for the UK 
environment itself, Russian migrants tended to limit their civic membership and activities to 
displays of ‘cultural citizenship’ (Stevenson, 2003; Wang, 2013; Miller, 2002), or more specifically 
to expressions of belonging to a particular broadly ‘national’ linguistic and cultural community. 
We shall then go on to discuss in the two sections that follow how attitudes changed significantly as 
the political situation started to shift in new directions, roughly from the end of the 2000s and the 
beginning of the 2010s. While the 2011-12 election protests in Russia sparked collective political 
action among Russian migrants in the UK, both online and offline, this greater level of activism was 
nonetheless, from 2014, rechannelled into efforts, by some migrants at least, to become better 
integrated into the UK political sphere. We shall conclude this narrative by a discussion of how the 
shock outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum reignited the desire of many UK Russians to 
reconsider and act upon the implications of their transnationalism in this now entirely new and 
somewhat disorienting political context, especially given that the unfolding of these developments 
coincided with a steady and significant worsening of the relationship between the Russian and 
British governments. 
Our analysis is, for the most part, based on data collected between 2010-16 by the first author 
(Morgunova) in a succession of different projects focused on the role of the digital sphere in 
contemporary global migration and diasporisation. These are: the MIGNET EU Project; the e-
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Diasporas Atlas project of the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (FMSH); the 
RESTART project of the International Migration and Gender Institute and Development of Migrant 
Youth Identities in Post-Referendum Scotland.3 The core data was collected online, but was 
invariably supplemented by offline materials, including in-depth semi-structured interviews, round 
tables, and digital surveys (full details of methods used and data collected in each of the above 
project are available on their websites). Data on the 2000s was collected earlier, partly in the 
context of the first author’s doctoral research on Russian-speakers in the United Kingdom, which 
also focused on early forms of migrant online activity (Morgunova, 2008), and partly based on 
fieldwork and interviews among UK-based Russian-speakers carried out by the second author 
(Byford) during 2007-08. 
As we shall be emphasising in what follows, given the paucity and limited nature of institutions 
enabling the political expression of Russians and Russian-speakers as emigrants/immigrants in their 
home and host societies respectively, digital (internet and social media) communication platforms 
have served as a vitally important environment for migrant social-movement-type activism 
(Klyueva, 2016; Karatzogianni et al., 2016; see also Tonkiss, 2017; Ramirez-Plascencia, 2016; 
Leurs & Potanesie, 2018). This is only partially in line with social media becoming, more generally, 
the political mobilisation vehicle of the present. Research shows that specifically migrant political 
participation is disproportionately biased towards the digital sphere. A 2008 study by the Oxford 
Internet Institute has concluded that, in the UK, migrants were the only segment of the population 
where higher levels of education and online participation did not lead to or correlate with offline 
social participation in neighbourhood initiatives, local campaigns or national political events 
(Helsper, 2008). This study did not seek to explain why this would be the case, but further light on 
the matter is shed by some of the findings of the above-mentioned e-Diasporas project,4 particularly 
in relation to the case of Russian-speaking migrants. This research has revealed a much higher 
density of migrants’ digital networking across national borders than their participation in the digital 
sphere of the receiving country itself, suggesting that digital platforms allow migrants to enact their 
transnationalism in ways not possible offline (Morgunova, 2012). 
 
Life is Elsewhere: Russians in Britain before 2010 
Until the beginning of the twenty-first century, migration to the UK from the area that was once the 
Soviet Union did not have a mass character. Britain never introduced larger-scale migration 
                                                          
3 http://www.mignetproject.eu/; http://www.fmsh.fr/fr/recherche/28020; http://www.epawomen.org/main-en#!__main-en. 
4 http://www.fmsh.fr/fr/recherche/28020. 
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schemes based on ethnicity, as Germany, Greece and Finland would have done, for instance, and 
the ethnic factor was certainly never salient for either late-Soviet or post-Soviet migration to the 
UK. It was only when, from 1997, the new Labour government started to relax UK’s immigration 
policy in the spirit of ‘selective openness’ that Russians and Russophones from the former Soviet 
area began to settle in Britain in more significant numbers. Crucial to this growing number of 
Russian-speaking migrants in the UK was the raise in the quota of work permits for professionals, 
followed by the introduction of the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) in 2002. This 
scheme of privileged migration included non-restricted employment for the highly-skilled migrant, 
creating an open route to British citizenship. Due to this ‘filter’, post-Soviet migration to Britain at 
this point was mostly a privileged, middle-class trend with the average migrant being a well-
educated, young and ambitious professional. There were, of course, other immigration routes as 
well, which many Russians benefitted from (e.g. spousal or student visas), but they still, for the 
most part, belonged to the same social stratum. With the accession of the Baltic States to the 
European Union in 2004, the number of Russophones settling in the UK started to grow more 
rapidly (although not all of these would have necessarily been self-identifying as ‘Russian’). This 
latter influx added a significant percentage of somewhat less highly qualified migrants to the 
existing ‘highly-skilled’ pool. 
Ethnographic research carried out at the very start of this period, especially fieldwork done towards 
the end of the 1990s, indicated that the low numbers of Russian-speaking migrants living in the UK 
at that time did not lead to the formation of larger community structures. Anthropologist Helen 
Kopnina (2005) noted these migrants’ self-isolation and found their social connections locked 
within localised ‘sub-communities’. Migrant communication networks were, moreover, divided into 
two quite distinct domains – those of their homeland and those of their new country of residence. 
Contact with their social circle ‘back home’ remained limited, facilitated mostly through periodic 
phone calls and occasional e-mail correspondence, relatively rare visits and accompanying gift 
exchange. 
The acceleration of Russophone immigration to the UK, which took place during the 2000s, 
coincided with the rapid development of new platforms of internet-based communication. The 
appearance of the first migrant online chat rooms and forums in the Russian-language segment of 
the internet during the early 2000s allowed post-Soviet newcomers to the UK to start exchanging 
experiences of migration and opinions about both home and host countries under conditions of 
partial anonymity (Morgunova, 2008; 2013; 2014). The expansion of online communications 
facilitated far more interaction across both social and geographical divides, which proved highly 
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important to a growing sense of ‘community’ within this migrant body, given its otherwise 
amorphous and dispersed character. 
Digital links came also to be increasingly relied on by migrants to connect with family and friends 
back home, as well as with those who might have emigrated to other parts of the world. These new 
forms of connectedness provided much more regular access to both formal and informal news from 
the former Soviet space, even about quite minor events, fostering a sense of continued participation 
in, and political membership of, the society of origin. This manifested itself mostly through 
responding to and sharing current affairs items, but at times could also include more concerted 
action, such as promoting the signing of an online petition or trying to raise money for some 
philanthropic cause. Those identifying as ‘Russian’ were, moreover, very likely to be following the 
more widely publicised and discussed political and cultural events in the Russian Federation, even 
if they had migrated to the UK from one of the other post-Soviet countries. 
By contrast, these migrants’ connectedness to UK society was confined to relatively narrow 
neighbourhood and professional circles. The British press and TV informed and orientated them in 
the new environment, but the impressions and images of the host country that they formed in this 
way often competed with their preconceived ideas about Britain, shaped by cultural associations 
formed prior to migration (Morgunova, 2010). Significantly, the Russophone migrants’ 
participation in English-language internet communication in the context of the British digital sphere 
remained undeveloped. This radically contrasted the degree of internet-based networking in the 
Russian language, especially, but not only, between Russophones who shared the predicament of 
migration. This separation of domains of communication went hand in hand with expressions of 
ambivalence about UK political life, despite the fact that these migrants usually wished to settle in 
this country in the longer term. In their discourse, the UK often featured as a place in which they 
were happy to live and work for the time being, a country they wanted to explore and learn more 
about, but hardly the society where they felt they truly belonged or even wanted to belong. They 
invariably positioned themselves as observers of, rather than participants in, this society. 
And yet, by the end of the 2000s, the analysis of online exchanges among this population reveals 
the crystallisation of a distinctive and quite complex sense of being ‘Russian in the UK’ 
(Morgunova, 2013). This self-identification was made up, in fact, of a series of quite different, but 
intersecting, mutually entangled axes: a) continued identifications with native cities, regions and 
countries (in Russia or other parts of the former Soviet Union; cf. also Pechurina, 2015; 2016); b) a 
strong sense of a shared political and cultural past and present (though not necessarily the future) – 
essentially the history of the former Russian empire and even more so the Soviet Union (cf. Byford, 
2009a); c) mutually comparable experiences of migration to and life in different parts of Britain 
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(experiences that appeared to suggest emergent feelings of ‘belonging’ in a given place within the 
UK, but that still blended, ambivalently, with the recognition of being ‘different’); d) attempts to 
reconcile the latter split and work through this ambivalence by identifying with a broader, supra-
national civilisation, especially that of ‘European-ness’ (Morgunova, 2006; 2010); e) a sense of 
having an increasingly visible collective presence in the broader British multicultural landscape as 
one of its distinctive ‘communities’ (cf. Byford, 2014b); and f) a ‘cosmopolitan’ understanding of 
one’s place in the world as a member of a global workforce and consumer of global media and 
goods, including one’s self-fashioning as a fundamentally free, mobile and independent-minded 
agent. 
The rapid rise in the number of Russophones migrating to the UK during the 2000s also stimulated 
burgeoning activity of offline self-organisation and the emergence of diverse forms of migrant 
entrepreneurship. The latter led to the creation of a new business niche serving the culturally-
specific needs of fellow post-Soviet migrants: from restaurants and shops to legal and medical 
services. These were rarely ‘Russian’ in the strict and narrow sense, and were usually run by and 
catered for immigrants from Eastern Europe more broadly. Among the new businesses targeting 
this growing ‘marketplace’ (Byford, 2009b: 58-59) were also a number of newspapers and 
magazines (Byford, 20014a: 128-132; Morgunova, 2013). Particularly visible were Saturday 
Russian schools offering classes in Russian language and culture for the children of migrants. These 
emerged in many towns and areas, serving also as key local community hubs and sometimes 
receiving partial support from the UK local authorities. There was also a proliferation of activity-
based social clubs and cultural gatherings, including book fairs, public lectures, concerts and sports 
meetings. Some of the social networking thrived also within more narrowly defined interest-groups, 
such as Russophones studying at UK universities or highflying professionals working in the City of 
London. 
The mobilisations of ‘Russians in Britain’ tended, therefore, by and large, to be confined to 
migrants representing a distinct (‘Russian’) cultural identity within British society. The only other 
area likely to lead to collective mobilisation was the defence of their rights specifically as migrants. 
For example, when in 2008 the UK’s Home Office decided to introduce a cap on immigration and 
declined a number of visa and naturalisation applications that had been made before the rules had 
been changed, the issue sparked an outcry on Rutalk, the most popular UK-based Russophone 
online forum.5 This led a group of British-based Russian lawyers to come together via this same 
forum and join forces, resulting in a successful collective appeal case (Travis, 2008).  
                                                          
5 http://www.rutalk.co.uk/forum.php. 
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The late 2000s also saw the sharpening of ‘community politics’ within this now considerably 
enlarged and visible migrant body (Byford, 2014a: 132-135). This was manifested mostly through 
the efforts of certain activists to ‘unite’ the above disparate entrepreneurial ventures and initiatives 
into an integrated ‘diasporic community’ by establishing an umbrella organisation at the level of the 
UK as a whole. This was supposed to be an organisation recognised as an official representative 
body by both the Russian and UK authorities and therefore able to negotiate and lobby on behalf of 
‘UK Russian-speakers’. Notable in this context was the creation at the end of 2006 of the so-called 
Russian Speaking Community of GB Ltd. or Obshchina, led by Vladimir Bobkov and Natalia 
Nikolaeva.6 Nikolaeva also created an organisation dubbed the Russian Immigrants Association,7 
which later joined the EU Russian-speakers’ Alliance.8 As it turned out, however, such initiatives 
lacked the financial means, human capital, social connections and symbolic legitimacy to forge 
anything resembling a truly representative organ of the purported ‘diaspora’; indeed, they were 
largely ignored by the bulk of UK-based Russophone migrants. 
In 2007 the Russian Federation developed its own initiative to ‘consolidate’ the UK-based 
Russophone ‘diaspora’ by inviting some of the migrant activists to establish the so-called 
Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots,9 which would serve both as part of Russia’s global 
‘compatriot’ (sootechestvenniki) network and as a local association representing the UK’s ‘Russian-
speaking Community’ (Byford 2012: 728-730). Many smaller Russophone organisations and 
activists in the UK showed willingness to be associated with and become involved in its activities in 
the hope of gaining extra capital (symbolic and potentially also financial). The timing of the 
Russian state’s efforts to engage the UK’s Russophone diasporic entrepreneurs was just right: in the 
mid-2000s migrant support for the Russian government was high, with the Russian middle classes, 
both inside and outside Russia, enjoying stability, growing prosperity and cultural freedoms. 
Russia’s vibrant economy and cultural scene, its keen interest in Western culture and lifestyles were 
evident to migrants who visited their native land for holidays and who kept in touch with their 
relatives. The Russian government was simultaneously establishing outreach and cultural 
diplomacy programmes as a means of promoting Russia on the international stage. This included 
the launching of The Russian World Foundation,10 for example, and also programmes designed to 
attract successful Russians living abroad to ‘reinvest’ in Russia – not least scientists and 
professionals who were being encouraged to see themselves not as never-to-return émigrés, but as 
transnational citizens who could input positively into Russia’s growth even while remaining 
                                                          
6 http://www.obshina.org. 
7 http://opencharities.org/charities/1077222. 
8 http://www.eursa.eu/. 
9 https://www.russiancouncil.org.uk/. 
10 http://russkiymir.ru/en/. 
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employed in the West.11 Consequently, the state-backed initiative of creating a global network of 
‘compatriot councils’, which seemed to fall into this same category of initiatives of positively 
engaging ‘compatriots’ across the globe as a means of opening up Russia to the rest of the world, 
was initially met with sympathy by many Russians in the UK. 
And yet, the Russian authorities’ ambition to make strategic political use of this constructed 
‘diaspora’ as part of its ‘soft-power’ initiatives was never going to be confined to the promotion and 
preservation of Russian culture and language. Indeed, as soon as the first significant international 
tensions arose, namely the war in Georgia in the summer of 2008, Russian embassy officials in the 
UK encouraged the Coordinating Council of Compatriots to come out, supposedly as a 
representative organisation of the UK’s ‘Russian community’, in support and defence of Russia’s 
position – for instance, by making press statements on the topic (Byford, 2012: 729). However, 
such public pronouncements on the part of a loyal sootechestvenniki organ remained low profile and 
were hardly noticed by either the wider migrant body or by the UK press, serving only to confirm 
the lack of credibility of such ‘umbrella’ organisations, while also exposing their ineffectiveness as 
mobilisers of the ‘diaspora’ for any kind of political cause.  
 
The Unbearable Lightness of Being: A Russian Spring in the UK  
The early 2010s saw a significant shift in the way Russians in the UK mobilised politically, in 
direct response to the events in Russia itself and as part of related mobilisations in other parts of 
‘Russia abroad’ (Kliuchnikova, 2013). Work on the MIGNET EU project by the first author 
(Morgunova) during 2010-2012 coincided with this critical period of political uplift – the formation 
of an anti-government protest movement in the wake of the December 2011 Duma elections and the 
run-up to the March 2012 presidential elections. The MIGNET EU project had, in fact, identified 
the Russian-speaking diaspora’s responses to the Russian government’s policies as something 
essential to monitor even before the 2011 Duma elections and certainly in the build-up to them. It 
was clear that Russians living abroad were at this point starting to engage increasingly actively in 
various online chat rooms with burning questions surrounding Russia’s political present and 
future.12 
When street protests began in Russia in December 2011, following widespread reports of election 
irregularities, Russians living abroad, including the UK, were stirred into oppositional action – 
action that was, based on evidence from the 2000s, far from typical of this group. Mobilisation was 
                                                          
11 http://base.garant.ru/12174930 (Postanovlenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii No. 220 from 9 April 2010). 
12 http://www.mignetproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/MIGNET-WP-10-Thematic-Report.pdf. 
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generated through the intertwining of online and offline activism: events in one domain prompted 
activity in the other, and vice versa, the two reinforcing each other through a positive feedback 
loop. Offline protest, such as street demonstrations, emerged mostly out of prior online 
mobilisation. Interviews with participants and a related digital survey have shown that only a tiny 
minority did not systematically combine online and offline activism (Karatzogianni et al., 2016; 
Morgunova, 2013). The two forms of protest were in fact impossible to separate: the effect of street 
demonstrations depended hugely on the sharing of pictures of the events via social networks or 
blogs affiliated with mass media outlets. Important to note here was that established diaspora 
organisations played no role in this mobilisation. The two organisations that had previously claimed 
to be ‘representing’ the UK Russian-speaking ‘diaspora’ – the aforementioned Compatriots Council 
and Obshchina – did not initiate any actions during the protests. 
A distinctive aspect of this activism was its transnational nature, with protests being sparked across 
different countries. Among the most visible were the protests in London and these had impact well 
beyond the UK, becoming one of the most searched items on the Runet more generally. Types of 
protest events and activities, as well as the language of protest, were borrowed, adapted and 
recycled between different global locations, inspiring and reinforcing one another in ways that were 
hardly coordinated (Kliuchnikova, 2013). It is worth noting that these mobilisations also often 
included non-Russians: many of the protesting Russians were inspired to share their newfound 
political enthusiasm with their colleagues and neighbours, inviting British or European friends to 
join them in street demonstrations. The internet, or, more precisely, certain online hubs, such as 
Rutalk, served as vital ‘aggregators’ or ‘synthesisers’ of this transnational protest activity. Nearly 
50% of the longest and most viewed threads on Rutalk across late 2011 and early 2012 were 
focused on the topic of the elections and the associated protests. They included a mass of uploaded 
photos and videos, both those that the participants had created themselves and those reposted from 
the media. These materials were usually immediately subjected to intense commentary, generating 
further discussions and uploads. 
The vote of Russian citizens resident in the UK in the March 2012 presidential elections starkly 
contrasted the ultimate result of the election. When the UK votes were counted, it was the 
billionaire businessman Mikhail Prokhorov who came top with 57.52%, while Vladimir Putin came 
second with a mere 22.51%. The ultimate electoral count was, however, 63.6% for Putin and just 
8% for Prokhorov. This striking discrepancy was immediately highlighted by the London-based 
blogger Konstantin Pinaev, whose blogs at that moment ranked 78th in popularity on the Runet as a 
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whole.13 More significantly still, the political activism of ‘expats’ during this period had a direct 
and immediate consequence on the Russian officialdom’s attitudes towards ‘Russia abroad’. 
The diaspora’s election behaviour in 2012 led to significant changes to the way the votes of 
‘absentee’ Russian citizens were to be counted in the next Duma elections, due in 2016. In the 2012 
presidential elections the votes of 1.9 million Russian citizens registered with diplomatic missions 
globally were shared between just six Russian voting areas, including Moscow and St Petersburg. 
In the 2016 Duma elections ‘absentee’ votes were redistributed across as many as 75 constituencies 
in over 30 different voting areas, in such a way that the overall share of the votes from abroad 
would never be more than 10% of the votes in each constituency (Kornia, 2015). The votes of UK-
based Russian citizens were allocated to the city of Tomsk in Southern Siberia (Central Election 
Committee, decree no. 304/1740-6). According to Boris Ebzeev, a member of the Central Election 
Committee, behind this decision to ‘dilute’ the votes of absentees was the fact that ‘Russians living 
abroad can think in a very different way [to those resident in Russia]’ (Ushakova, 2016). Indeed, the 
rules were changed with a view to ‘protecting’ national borders from the ‘extrinsic’ political 
influence of overly ‘liberal’ expatriate circles. 
Since 2012 one can also see a further shift testifying to the Russian authorities’ interest in 
distinguishing the expat (in the sense of citizen of the Russian Federation living permanently 
outside Russian borders) from the Russian citizen resident in Russia. On 4 June 2014 the Russian 
Duma ratified a new law criminalising failure to declare the possession of a foreign passport or 
residence permits for all those who were not formally registered as residing ‘permanently’ outside 
Russia. Yet another measure separating these two categories of citizen is that which obliges only 
Russian citizens with registered residency in the Russian Federation to report all movements of 
funds to and from foreign accounts that they hold,14 something that does not apply to those 
registered as living permanently abroad. Both these laws have created a strict dividing line between 
citizens who belong squarely to the Russian polity (and are subject to the above controls) and those 
based outside it. While these measures appear not to be targeting Russians living outside Russia, 
they are designed to diminish precisely the transnationalism of Russian citizens, which runs counter 
to the neo-nationalist ideology and the ‘nationalising’ state project (Brubaker, 2011) on which the 
defence of Russia’s present regime is built. Closely related to this new strategy of the Russian state 
is also the controversial policy to label all Russian organisations receiving grants from international 
                                                          
13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17178830. 
14 http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/71287602 (Postanivlenie Pravitelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii No.1365) 
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funding bodies and charities ‘foreign agents’, which are for this reason prevented from 
collaborating with Russian state-funded bodies.15 
The introduction of all these measures has created a serious dilemma for Russians resident abroad: 
no longer at the forefront of Russia’s ‘opening up’ to the world, these migrants now find themselves 
forced to choose where their loyalty ultimately lies, given that living permanently outside Russia’s 
borders appears to make their political trustworthiness inherently questionable. This has led many 
UK-based Russians to change the way in which they are responding to political events in and 
around Russia. Interviews that the first author (Morgunova) conducted during 2012-2014 with 
migrants from different countries of the former Soviet area have shown that those from the Russian 
Federation discussed the political situation in their home country reluctantly and were mostly 
sceptical about the likelihood of a significant political change taking place there.16 This contrasted 
the attitudes of interviewees from other post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine, Latvia or Georgia, 
who seemed keener to discuss the social and political developments in their homelands, even 
though the political situation was by no means rosy there either. 
This shift in attitude among Russians in the UK was evident also in the almost complete 
disappearance of street protests there after 2012. There were no mass public demonstrations of 
solidarity with the 2013 Bolotnaya Square demonstrations in Moscow, for example. There was also 
no echo in the UK of the anticorruption protests that took place in Moscow, St Petersburg and other 
Russian cities in April 2017.17 The decline of appetite for political action among the Russian 
diaspora during this period was evident also in online forums, such as Rutalk. The analysis of the 
most active Rutalk threads that the first author (Morgunova) carried out in August 2016 revealed 
that while political events affecting Russia still seemed to be of considerable interest and concern to 
those in the diaspora, they were, crucially, not generating mobilisation as such on the part of those 
contributing to the forum. The most popular thread by far was devoted to the relationship between 
Russia and Ukraine; next in popularity was a thread on Putin (who was, following the Runet 
convention, referred to exclusively through euphemisms and abbreviations – Pu, Vo and Vova); 
third was, tellingly, the thread called ‘Depoliticised topics’; and fourth was a thread about sports. 
Typical of these threads were fragmented and meandering commentaries that did not focus on any 
one political event or key issue, and certainly never coalesced into anything resembling a political 
campaign, let alone movement. Discussions included a wide spectrum of views, but rarely produced 
sustained debates. Most common was the ironic tone and the non-normative writing style typical of 
                                                          
15 http://base.garant.ru/70204242 (Federal Law 121-FZ, 20 July 2012). 
16 Project Restart, Grundtwig Partnership GRP/12/188P. 
17 This contrasts with increased mobilisations of Ukrainian migrants over Euromaidan in 2014 (Malyutina, 2014). 
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the Runet subculture more generally (online Russian slang based on grotesque orthographic and 
grammatical distortions, dubbed zhargon podonkov or padonkaffskii iazyk, translatable as ‘scumbag 
lingo’, and also olbanskii iezyg, translatable as ‘Olbanian lingige’). 
 
The Festival of Insignificance? UK Russian Migrant Mobilisations before and after Brexit 
The evident reluctance of Russians living abroad to take collective action to effect political change 
‘back home’ after the failure of political activism in 2012 was not simply the consequence of their 
disillusionment in Russia’s potential for liberal-democratic development, but also of a sense that 
oppositional activity from abroad was powerless to effect change. Political ambivalence among 
Russians abroad grew further in the context of the disorientating rifts in the ‘national body’ 
following the conflict in Ukraine from 2015. At the level of online communications (e.g. migrant 
forums), one notes, over the course of the 2010s, an increase in the above-mentioned tactics of 
ironic detachment, avoidance of straight talk, and deliberate linguistic distortions. At the level of 
offline action, there is, since the mid-2010s, a retreat to once again placing culture (theatre 
performances, musical events and language learning), at the forefront of diasporic activity. 
In addition to this, however, some Russians living in the UK – especially those who have become 
naturalised British citizens or have been granted the permanent right to remain – have started to 
look for a more meaningful place for themselves within the British political sphere. To the extent to 
which ‘belonging’ to a polity is a performative effect of participation in it, this rerouting of political 
activism from the Russian to the British socio-political domain is indicative of a certain rebalancing 
of the Russian migrants’ socio-political transnationalism, which in the 2000s, and even more so the 
early 2010s, was, as suggested above, oriented rather more towards the country of origin. 
Both online data and the interviews gathered prior to 2012 show that while Russian migrants 
displayed a degree of interest in and awareness of the social and political life in the UK, relatively 
few took an active part in it, even after becoming naturalised citizens. This applies both to local 
civic initiatives and to political events of national significance, such as elections. The only way in 
which Russians participated more visibly in British civic life (and this especially during the late 
2000s) was as ‘representatives’ of a particular culture – the ‘Russian culture’ which they valued as 
part of their own identity; which they performed as distinctive, even exotic, in the UK context; and 
finally, which they understood to be rightfully commanding respect and deserving attention as one 
of the major ‘world cultures’. 
The reason for this was that British public life offered migrants (as ‘political strangers’) only this 
one type of ‘opportunity structure’ for mobilisation and collective action (McAdam et al., 2001): as 
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‘newcomers’ they were enabled, and even encouraged, to form a culturally-framed minority 
‘community’ and to perform a given cultural identity which would be incorporated into the UK’s 
expandable multicultural patchwork. This was the opportunity structure that most Russian diasporic 
entrepreneurs took advantage of during the 2000s when devising their social, cultural or commercial 
projects. As we have seen above, though, many also tried to combine this British opportunity 
structure with opportunity structures offered simultaneously by the Russian state, such as the 
‘compatriots project’ and other cultural diplomacy initiatives. 
What we see happening in the mid-2010s, however, is the attempt by at least some Russian 
migrants to seek out and/or take advantage of other kinds of opportunity structures in the UK’s 
political sphere, such that would not reduce their participation in the British polity to sheer ‘cultural 
membership’ – in other words, structures that would enable alternative forms of political 
participation by allowing ‘new citizens’ to capitalise on being from ‘elsewhere’, yet making a 
meaningful contribution to the mainstream political life of the host society. 
One example of this form of mobilisation would be the group dubbed the Conservative Friends of 
Eurasia – a political activist network created in 2015, which combines support for the UK’s 
Conservative Party with origins in the former Soviet Union or its successor states.18 The founder 
and leader of the group is Botagoz Hopkinson, a naturalised Briton of Kazakhstani origin, a 
Russian-speaker born in the USSR, who had been a member of the Conservative Party for over 
twenty years.19 The ‘patrons’ of the group are Conservative MPs and established party activists, 
some of whom are interested in former Soviet ‘Eurasia’.20 However, Hopkinson set up this group 
specifically to mobilise settled immigrants from the former Soviet area to support the Conservatives 
on a platform of broadly defined ‘conservative’ ideals, including both the privileging of free 
enterprise and the market economy and the valuing of ‘family’ and ‘tradition’.21 
This political support group represents a relatively novel structure for migrant mobilisation (at least 
for those coming from the former Soviet Union) insofar as it transforms these migrants into 
sympathisers of a major UK political party. The group clearly serves the function of expanding and 
diversifying the Conservative Party’s base of support; but it also allows these ‘new citizens’ to 
contribute to political life specifically as individuals with origins in a geographically very large and 
politically and economically not unimportant part of the world. The ‘former Soviet’ zone is here 
redubbed ‘Eurasia’, which has the effect of downplaying the significance of individual national 
cultural, political and economic agendas, as well as the Russia-dominated geopolitics of this region. 
                                                          
18 https://www.cfeurasia.com/. 
19 https://www.cfeurasia.com/people/botagoz-hopkinson-chairwoman. 
20 https://www.cfeurasia.com/people/type/Spokesperson. 
21 https://www.cfeurasia.com/membership. 
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Having said that, Hopkinson recruited the group’s members by promoting her initiative across 
already existing post-Soviet diaspora circles, primarily via Russian-speaking community 
organisations, cultural centres, churches, professional and personal networks. The Conservative 
Friends of Eurasia interact through Facebook and a mailing list, using Russian alongside English. 
Its members are, however, mostly mobilised to support Conservative political campaigns, such as, 
for example, the 2016 London mayoral elections.  
Thus, migrant political mobilisation is here being integrated with the very heart of the British 
political establishment. The political activism that this type of network fosters radically contrasts 
both the public display of cultural identity that dominated diasporic mobilisations of the late 2000s, 
and the homeland-oriented performances of political protest, emblematised by the anti-Putin 
demonstrations of the early 2010s. At the same time, however, the Conservative Friends of Eurasia 
framework cannot avoid considerably limiting its members’ scope for autonomous political action. 
Members of this group are being mobilised as a) Conservative supporters and b) as ‘British 
Eurasians’. The term ‘Eurasian’ says very little in itself, but still appears to frame the group as a 
quasi-minority. For sure, the performance of a distinctive ‘culture’ is not relevant here and is in fact 
nullified by the vagueness of the term ‘Eurasian’. However, difference is still prominently there; a 
‘difference’, though, which is to be overcome, or rather ‘bridged’, through the supposedly common 
values of broadly understood ‘conservativism’. It is these values that are expected to enable the 
immigrants in question to politically integrate into British society by actively supporting the 
Conservative Party.  
And yet, the interest that this group has for the Conservative Party lies primarily in its potential for 
providing contacts with, and expertise in, the various countries of the former Soviet geopolitical 
area. In other words, this party group as an opportunity structure thrives on a dynamic of exchange 
of social and political capital between the Conservative Party and a network of ‘new citizens’ from 
a strategically important part of the world. However, it remains unclear whether those mobilised to 
join this group are ever likely to be more than a collection of individuals engaged in such an 
exchange of capital, as opposed to a collective mobilised to effect political change of relevance to it 
precisely as a collective. 
A very different example has been the response of Russians living in the UK to the shock outcome 
of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 – a seismic political development, in which the topic of 
migration has played, and continues to play, a critical role. The manner in which the UK is going to 
dissolve its ties with the EU is (at the point of writing this article) yet to be negotiated, but migrants 
of all national backgrounds are already actively revising their narratives of belonging in Britain, as 
well as taking individual and collective action in response to the referendum result. This also 
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applies to those who identify themselves as ‘Russian’, irrespective of the fact that only a portion of 
them would have citizenship ties to the EU itself (namely, migrants from Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia, as well as those previously settled in other EU states, such as Finland, Germany or the 
Czech Republic, who had received citizenship of these countries). Indeed, the consequences of 
Brexit on the situation of Russian-speaking migrants in the UK is more complex than that, and the 
situation is not exclusively related to changes to the freedom of movement between the UK and the 
EU. For example, while migrants from the Russian Federation can still keep their Russian 
citizenship, even if they become naturalised Britons, Russian-speakers who have come to settle in 
the UK from Latvia or Lithuania, Ukraine or Belarus, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan must choose 
between one or the other citizenship. Their choice could potentially have serious practical 
consequences, including increased risk of deportation in some situations (BNN, 2017), prompting, 
moreover, added dilemmas of national self-identification and sense of belonging.  
Furthermore, the issue of Brexit is not simply a technical matter of the UK’s legal and economic 
relationship with the EU, but a major social, political and cultural battleground in which the anti-
immigrant neo-nationalism of UK’s ‘Brexiteers’ is locking horns with a liberal movement for 
‘Open Britain’ – a movement that was designed to mobilise Britons who voted Remain in the 2016 
referendum, but that is also proving to be a natural political home for non-British immigrants – EU 
citizens first and foremost, but also many other migrants, including Russians.22  
The positioning of UK Russians in this movement and their identification with it requires, however, 
some unpicking if the motivations behind their mobilisation are to become clearer. The 
ethnographic research that the first author (Morgunova) carried out pre-Brexit has shown that 
Russians immigrating to the UK have tended to identify strongly with what they presented as 
‘European-ness’ (Morgunova, 2006; 2007; 2013). This has been the case already in the early 2000s, 
when ‘European-ness’ was invoked as a means of transcending the previously dominant Cold War 
binary of the ‘Soviet Union’ vs. ‘the West’ (the latter being emblematised especially by the USA). 
Crucially, however, Russian migrants’ identifications with ‘European-ness’, while being mostly 
cultural and civilisational (e.g. Christian rather than Muslim), also carried racial connotations – it 
allowed Russians arriving in the UK to distinguish themselves from immigrants coming from places 
like Asia, Africa or the Middle East (Morgunova, 2006; 2007; 2010). 
Thus, ‘European-ness’ connotes for Russian migrants a certain symbolic claim to the legitimacy of 
their immigration, a ‘moral right’ of being in the UK – a right that (supposedly) not all immigrants 
can claim in equal measure. This moral right to immigration to the UK, which the Russians might 
                                                          
22 http://www.open-britain.co.uk/. 
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root in their ‘European-ness’, competes, however, with alternative claims. Indeed, migrant groups 
whose origins lie in the former British Empire or the Commonwealth as its successor are likely to 
use this historic connection to claim their own moral right to immigrating to and being in the UK. 
What is more, they would use this claim to favourably distinguish their right to immigration to the 
UK from the ‘illegitimate’ incursions of ‘East Europeans’ from behind the former Iron Curtain. 
UK Russians have also always sought to exempt themselves from types and forms of immigration 
which they would construct as either illegitimate or inferior, especially immigration which is 
construed as failing to ‘contribute’ to the UK as the receiving society (for instance, the immigration 
of asylum seekers). In fact, Russians living in the UK would often share, both offline and online, 
their concern that the levels of immigration to the UK were unsustainable. They would regularly 
voice support for broadly right-wing policies aimed at reducing excessive immigration flows, 
especially the immigration of those not ‘contributing’ in an obvious way. They would also be 
incredulous or dismissive of the fact that one could find Russians among asylum seekers or illegal 
immigrants, apart from in relatively rare cases of individuals with criminal backgrounds and 
connections. 
That said, Russian migrants were usually highly critical of the British hard right, since these groups 
indiscriminately labelled all immigration, even that of legitimate labour, as inherently bad for 
Britain. At the same time, however, Russians would regularly try to avoid being identified with 
‘East European migrant labour’ (emblematised in the UK principally by ‘the Poles’), given that this 
group is among the prime targets of the British anti-immigrant right which has been on the rise 
since the end of the 2000s. In order to avoid being (con)fused with that category of migrant, 
Russians living in the UK have shown an increasing tendency to affect a distinctly ‘cosmopolitan’ 
status. Indeed, the sense of being ‘rightfully’ in the UK as a migrant has become dependent on them 
self-identifying as, in reality, ‘citizens of the world’ (something made easier by the fact that the 
majority belong to the educated, professional middle class). This is why, over the course of the 
2010s, increasingly popular among UK post-Soviet Russophone migrants has become their self-
identification as ‘global Russians’ – a development that can also be seen as a diasporic response to 
the above-discussed post-2012 neo-nationalist retrenchment of the Russian Federation. 
However, anti-immigrant neo-nationalism that has been sweeping the UK in the build-up to and 
immediately after the Brexit referendum, and which appears to be turning all foreigners, including 
West Europeans, into undesirable aliens, has clearly had an impact on post-Soviet Russophones 
living in the UK, including those with secure British citizenship rights. In reaction to the agendas of 
the ‘Brexiteers’ (or ‘Leavers’), whose position is dominated by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of 
regaining ‘control of our own borders’ and the neo-nationalist narrative of ‘restoring Britishness’ 
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and returning to ‘Britain as it used to be’ (Hobolt, 2016), many Russian settlers to the UK have also 
seen an opportunity to align their ‘global Russian-ness’ with a British political cause by joining 
British ‘Remainers’ who, for the most part, emphasise the positive contributions that immigration 
has historically made to the UK economy and society. 
Ethnographic fieldwork carried out both offline and online by the first author (Morgunova) in 2016 
-2018, which included observations of explicit discussions about Brexit among the UK Russophone 
community, has revealed that many post-Soviet migrants took active part in lively anti-Brexit street 
demonstrations, especially those in London, and have also been particularly keen to sign the 
petition for the EU referendum to be repeated.23 Motivations for such actions lie arguably less in the 
belief that this protest will make an actual difference to the outcome of Brexit. Rather, through acts 
of participation in movements such as ‘Open Britain’ these migrants are materially demonstrating 
their belonging to a British polity as made up of an ‘extraordinarily complex, differentiated 
population’, rather than existing (as the ‘Brexiteers’ would have it) as ‘a fictive singularity’ dubbed 
‘The People’ (Reeves, 2016); and it is precisely this concept of the British polity – as complex and 
differentiated, in other words as including them as newcomers – that they are explicitly 
campaigning for. 
 
Conclusion 
Russians (and post-Soviet Russian-speakers more broadly) who have found themselves as migrants 
in the UK over the past couple of decades have been attracting sustained interest among researchers 
in the social sciences and the humanities, with a number of ethnographic studies being produced on 
the topic, especially as PhDs. While the time-period in question is not long in absolute terms, the 
political landscape of the two countries, as well as the specific context of migration to and settling 
(or not) in the UK, have been changing in significant ways between the late 1990s and the late 
2010s. This article has re-examined the case of ‘Russians in the UK’ by focusing on the evolution 
of their political mobilisations and civic participation across the British and Russian polities – a 
topic that has so far been largely neglected. The transformations of broadly defined civic and 
political engagements of Russians based in the UK during this period were governed by the 
following key factors that we have discussed above: the changing context of immigration 
opportunities in the UK; the technological advancements of new modes of communication; 
significant political shifts in both Russia and the UK; and (last, but not least) the availability of 
                                                          
23 Levels of offline activity (street protests) were highest in London: many London-based respondents talked about their own or their 
friends’ participation in anti-Brexit marches. Scottish respondents, by contrast, although actively discussing and unambiguously 
opposting Brexit in Russian-language online platforms, were not as active offline. 
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specific opportunity structures for mobilisation, limited as these are bound to be, given the 
migrants’ inherently transnational position in-between at least two and likely more distinct polities. 
The 2000s – the period of exceptional economic growth, stability and openness to the world of both 
Russia and the UK – was the decade in which the migration of Russians to the UK (by no means 
only those coming from the Russian Federation itself) boomed, leading, by around 2006-2008, to a 
situation where there was suddenly far greater possibility for collective mobilisation within this 
migrant population than would have ever been the case previously. However, during this period, 
only two basic kinds of opportunity structures for civic mobilisation were made available to these 
migrants – the structure needed for developing a form of culturally-defined minority migrant 
community on the British multicultural model; and the structure enabling Russians in the diaspora 
to become part of a global network of Russian ‘compatriots’ and thus turned into an instrument of 
Russia’s foreign relations.  
Many activists in the UK’s Russian diaspora did their best to make use of both these types of 
structures, often simultaneously, but without much lasting success. The ‘presence’ of ‘Russians in 
Britain’ was marketed loud and clear, but the majority of Russians living in the UK were unlikely to 
take a particularly active part in either the British or the Russian polity. For sure, many enjoyed the 
role of mediators or performers of Russian culture abroad, but otherwise they acted mostly as 
passive observers of, rather than active participants in, both the sending and receiving societies. The 
reason for this was that the two opportunity structures available to them were, in reality, quite 
restrictive, keeping them strategically on the margins of the two polities, while greatly limiting the 
range of possibilities of effective participation in them. 
Things changed dramatically in the early 2010s, with the unexpected emergence of a new 
opportunity structure – the spread of a significant transnational protest movement against political 
corruption in the Russian Federation, a movement sparked by the evidence of serious irregularities 
in the Russian Duma and presidential elections between the end of 2011 and the spring of 2012. At 
this point, Russian politics spilled onto the streets of many a Western metropolis, including, 
prominently, London. New technologies, social media and internet communications helped 
catalyse, synthesise and amplify offline protest activities both within individual countries and across 
national borders. 
As an opportunity structure, a protest is never meant to last, though – it is supposed to bring about 
the desired political change and then either disappear or transform into some other form of 
mobilisation. Ultimately, the 2012 protests against electoral fraud, especially those which took 
place abroad, failed to achieve their wished-for impact. More importantly for our analysis, in the 
 23 
 
UK, this movement proved to be very short-lived and did not grow or transform into a sustained 
opportunity structure for continued political mobilisation. While a political opposition movement 
has managed to survive in mainland Russia, and there are also oppositional activists operating from 
abroad (e.g. Open Russia), there is little evidence of continued protest among the wider diaspora, at 
least in the UK. The absence of a collective movement here is not, of course, an observation about 
individual migrants’ views on Russian politics. What is relevant to the analysis presented in this 
article are not the political beliefs, hopes and opinions of those in the diaspora, but their wider, 
collective political mobilisation as Russians living abroad. 
As discussed above, the Russian government has since introduced a series of policies effecting a 
systematic separation and growing disenfranchisement of Russians permanently resident abroad 
from political developments in Russia itself, leading to a potential rift between ‘mainland Russians’ 
and ‘global Russians’. This, as we argue, has prompted many Russians in the UK, especially those 
who have ended up settling there permanently, to look for new ways in which they could become 
more engaged in the UK’s own political and civic sphere, without, however, reducing this 
participation to the sheer representation of a culturally defined community (i.e. as de facto 
representatives of their home country or culture) on the model that was dominant in the latter half of 
the 2000s. Certain alternative opportunity structures for participation in UK’s political life (such as 
the political party group Conservative Friends of Eurasia) have been embraced by some migrants 
around the mid-2010s; however, these, as discussed, have inherent limitations and serve relatively 
narrow functions. 
As the 2010s are drawing to a close, it is the politics of Brexit – so closely tied to the issue of 
citizenship, migration, diversity and the identity of ‘Britain’ and ‘Europe’, which has become a 
significant new context and opportunity for at least some Russians living in the UK to mobilise as 
part of the British polity – and this for a cause that is both very British and eminently transnational. 
And yet, the position of ‘Russians’ in a neo-nationalising Britain, in a context where it is the latter’s 
relationship with the EU, rather than Russia, that is centre stage, remains politically peripheral. The 
progressive dissociation of ‘Russians in Britain’ from Russia itself is also making this migrant body 
appear increasingly marginal in the international relations spats between Russia and the UK which 
have been ratcheting up in this same period. Time will show if and what further opportunity 
structures for political and civic participation might become available to Russians living in Britain, 
and how precisely this will shape their future mobilisations. What is clear from the above analysis is 
that structures of mobilisation that favour migrants’ activism and make the most of it are those in 
which their transnationalism comes to the fore. What form, role and relevance this transnationalism 
will take across the contexts of a nationalising Russia and Brexit Britain remains an open question.  
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